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PATENTS-CONTRIBUTORY INFRINGEMENT AND PATENT MISUSE
UNDER 35 U.S.C. § 271-Dawson Chemical Co. v. Rohm & Haas
Co., 448 U.S. 176 (1980)
Dawson Chemical Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co. 1 held that the owner of a
patented process 2 could "tie" a license to practice the process to a sale of
a material, nonstaple component3 used in the process. The result'of this
"tying" arrangement is to foreclose competition from other manufactur-
ers of the component. In dealing with the issue, the Supreme Court faced
a question of statutory interpretation: whether section 271 (d) of the Patent
Act of 19524 altered the patent misuse doctrine 5 and the Mercoid deci-
sions6 so as to allow a patentee to control the market in unpatented, non-
staple components of his invention.
In 1968 the Monsanto Company obtained a patent on a chemical com-
pound commonly known as propanil. 7 In a lawsuit brought by Monsanto
against Rohm & Haas Co. for patent infringement, 8 this patent was de-
clared invalid on the ground that propanil had been implicitly revealed in
the prior art 9 as early as 1902, although there was no known use for the
1. 448 U.S. 176 (1980). While Dawson deals with a compound for use in a patented process, the
same problems arise with unpatented components of a patented combination of elements. See text
accompanying note 31 infra for a discussion of the Mercoid decisions which involved a patented
combination.
2. "Method" and "process" are used interchangeably throughout this note, although the statute,
35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (1976), uses the term process to describe inventions of this type. 35 U.S.C. §
100(b) (1976) states: "The term 'process' means process, art or method, and includes a new use of a
known process, machine, manufacture, composition of matter, or material." See 4 D. CHIsuM, PAT-
ENrs Apps. 2-12 (1980).
3. The statutory exception for staples applies to "article[s] or commodit[ies] of commerce suit-
able for substantial noninfringing use .... 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (1976). A nonstaple is thus an article
which has no known utility outside the patented invention.
4. 35 U.S.C. 88 1-293 (1976).
5. Under the patent misuse doctrine, the courts withhold any remedy for patent infringement
from a patent owner who "misuses" its patent by attempting to extend the patent monopoly beyond
its lawful scope. The patent owner can regain its rights by abandoning the misuse. See generally 4 D.
CmsuM, PATEmS § 19.04 (1980).
6. Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661 (1944) (Mercoid 1), and Mercoid
Corp. v. Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co., 320 U.S. 680 (1944) (Mercoid II). See 4 D. CHI-
SuM, PATENTS § 17.02[4] (1980) for a detailed discussion of these cases.
7. The scientific name for propanil is "3,4-Dichloropropionilide."
8. Monsanto Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 312 F. Supp. 778 (E.D. Pa. 1970), aff'd, 456 F.2d 592
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 934 (1972). Monsanto alleged direct infringement under 35 U.S.C.
§ 271(a) (1976).
9. For a discussion of the importance of "having been revealed in the prior art" for the patenta-
bility of an invention, see 2 D. CmsuM, PATENTS § 5.04[6] (1980). See generally Comment, Chemi-
cal Compounds Related As Genus and Species and the Patentability Requirement of Novelty, 54
WASH. L. REv. 815 (1979).
Washington Law Review
compound until the 1950's. 10 In 1974, Rohm & Haas patented a method
of applying propanil to established rice plants to kill weeds without harm-
ing the crops. Rohm & Haas does not practice its method itself nor does it
license others to market the method apart from its sales of propanil. Rohm
& Haas manufactures and sells propanil in packages which instruct pur-
chasers in the proper use of the patented method. The propanil package
label is a license to the purchaser to practice the method. "1 The compound
propanil remains an unpatentable substance but one with no known utility
except in the patented weed-killing method.
Before Rohm & Haas obtained approval for its process patent, Dawson
Chemical Co. and several other chemical manufacturers also sold pro-
panil in containers which instructed purchasers in the use of the weed-
killing method. After the Rohm & Haas patent was issued, Dawson and
others sought direct licenses from Rohm & Haas to market the process,
but their requests were denied. Instead, Rohm & Haas requested them to
cease selling propanil. When Dawson and other chemical manufacturers
persisted in selling the chemical, Rohm & Haas filed suit to enforce its
patent, charging them with inducing infringement in violation of 35
U.S.C. § 271(b) and contributory infringement in violation of 35 U.S.C.
§ 271(c). 12 In essence Rohm & Haas claimed that the defendants were
guilty of contributory infringement because they sold propanil, a nonsta-
ple, knowing it to be a material part of a patented process. Dawson de-
fended on the grounds that Rohm & Haas' refusal to issue method li-
censes, except to those who purchased the unpatented propanil from it
directly, constituted "tying" and hence patent misuse that barred recov-
ery for contributory infringement. 13
Both Dawson and Rohm & Haas moved for summary judgment. The
district court partially granted Dawson's motion. 14 The court reasoned
that regardless of whether the defendants had contributorily infringed the
method patent, Rohm & Haas committed patent misuse by tying the sale
of the unpatented propanil to the use of the patented process. ' 5 The dis-
trict court relied on a long line of Supreme Court decisions culminating in
Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Investment Co. (Mercoid 1)16 and Mer-
10. Monsanto Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 312 F. Supp. 778, 787 (E.D. Pa. 1970), aff'd, 456
F.2d 592 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 934 (1972).
11. This method of licensing has been judicially approved. See, e.g., United States v. Univis
Lens, 316 U.S. 241 (1942); Medeco Security Locks, Inc. v. Lock Technology Corp., 199 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 519 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). See also 4 D. CHISUM, PATENTS § 16.03[2] (1980).
12. Rohm & Haas Co. v. Dawson Chem. Co., 191 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 691 (S.D. Tex. 1976).
Section 271 of the Patent Act of 1952 is reprinted in note 39 infra.
13. 191 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 696.
14. Id. at 709.
15. Id. at707.
16. 320 U.S. 661 (1944).
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coid Corp. v. Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co. (Mercoid II). 17 The
district court held that the subsequent enactment of sections 271(c) and
(d) of the Patent Act did not affect the holdings but rather merely disap-
proved doubtful dicta in Mercoid 1.18
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that sec-
tions 271(c) and (d) did abrogate the Mercoid holdings. Accordingly, the
judgment of the trial court was reversed. 19 The court held that the equita-
ble defense of patent misuse no longer barred recovery for contributory
infringement where the patentee tied his patented method to the purchase
of an unpatented, nonstaple article of commerce used in that method. A
contrary holding, the court reasoned, would engraft on the statute a com-
pulsory licensing requirement that Congress did not intend. 20 The Su-
preme Court affirmed the Fifth Circuit in a 5-4 decision. 21
This casenote will discuss as background: (1) the judicial doctrines of
contributory infringement and patent misuse as they developed before
1952; (2) section 271 of the Patent Act of 1952; and (3) the impact of this
section on the contributory infringement/patent misuse doctrines in post-
1952 Supreme Court cases. An analysis section will contrast the majority
and minority interpretations of: (1) 35 U.S.C. §§ 271(c) and (d); (2) the
legislative history of the Patent Act of 1952; and (3) post-1952 Supreme
Court decisions as each impacts the result in Dawson. The final section
will discuss patent policy considerations absent from the Supreme Court's
analysis.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Development of the Doctrines of Contributory Infringement and
Patent Misuse
First appearing as the basis for the decision in Wallace v. Holmes,22
contributory infringement predated patent misuse. In Wallace, the paten-
tee had invented a new burner for an oil lamp, but his patented combina-
tion included unpatented components readily available in the market-
place. A competitor marketed the novel burner, minus the chimney
necessary for the lamp to burn. Because every element of the patentee's
17. 320 U.S. 680 (1944).
18. 191 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 698-99.
19. Rohm & Haas Co. v. Dawson Chem. Co., 599 F.2d 685 (5th Cir. 1979).
20. Id. at 704 n.27.
21. Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176 (1980). Justice Blackmnun wrote for
a five-Justice majority composed of Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart, Powell, and Rehn-
quist. Justice White wrote a dissenting opinion and was joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, and
Stevens. In addition Justice Stevens filed a separate dissenting opinion.
22. 29F. Cas. 74(C.C. Conn. 1871) (No. 17,100).
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claimed combination had not been replicated, the competitor's conduct
did not amount to direct infringement even though purchasers could com-
plete the combination individually by buying the readily available chim-
ney. Because of the impracticality of requiring the patentee to ferret out
and sue each innocent purchaser, the patentee was given protection from
the "palpable interference" of his competitor, interference which came
to be known as contributory infringement. 23
Although the doctrine of contributory infringement did not gain total
acceptance, it flourished in the lower courts. 24 The highwater mark in the
expansion of contributory infringement was Henry v. A.B. Dick Co., 25 a
1912 Supreme Court decision that permitted the patentee of a printing
machine to condition licensing the machine on the purchase of all neces-
sary supplies for the machine, such as paper and ink, from the patentee,
and further to sue a competing seller of ink for contributory infringement.
Although the Supreme Court recognized the practical necessity of the
doctrine of contributory infringement, the Court felt compelled to limit
the doctrine after A.B. Dick because it encouraged anticompetitive con-
duct. The Court's antidote to contributory infringement's abuses was the
doctrine of patent misuse. 26
A.B. Dick was overruled in Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal
Film Co.27 In Motion Picture, the Court found no contributory infringe-
ment where a conditional licensing arrangement similar to that in A.B.
Dick existed, and held the attempt to monopolize unpatented supplies
improper. 28 The focus of the decision was not the conduct of the alleged
infringer but the conduct of the patentee. By tying the grant of a license to
the purchase of unpatented supplies, the patentee had engaged in what
came to be known as patent misuse29 and was denied recovery for in-
fringement. In subsequent cases over the next three decades, litigants
tested the boundaries of the patent misuse doctrine. 30 The equitable de-
23. Id. at 79-80.
24. For citations of lower court cases decided during the period when contributory infringement
was given an expansive application, see Dawson, 448 U.S. at 189 n.8. See generally 4 D. CHISUNt,
PATENTS § 17.02[1] (1980) (discussion of many of the cases cited by the Dawson court).
25. 224 U.S. 1 (1912).
26. This was the interpretation given for the decline of contributory infringement by Justice
Blackmun in Dawson. 448 U.S. at 189. See generally 4 D. CHISUNI, PATENTS § 17.02[4] (1980)
(chronological analysis of cases which limited the doctrine of contributory infringement).
27. 243 U.S. 502, 518 (1917).
28. Id.
29. Id. at 515. See note 5 supra for a description of patent misuse.
30. Again and again the patent misuse doctrine was employed by the Supreme Court to bar a
patentee from relief from contributory infringement where the patentee attempted to control unpa-
tented staple materials. See, e.g., B.B. Chem. Co. v. Ellis, 314 U.S. 495 (1942) (practical difficul-
ties in marketing a patented invention do not justify patent misuse); Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger
526
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fense of patent misuse eclipsed contributory infringement and prohibited
the tying arrangements the Court had sanctioned before Motion Picture.
In the 1944 Mercoid decisions, 31 the Court consciously addressed the
scope of patent misuse in the case of a patentee who attempted to control
the market in a nonstaple, unpatented component of a patented combina-
tion.32 In Mercoid, a patentee licensed a manufacturer to produce an un-
patented, nonstaple component of the patent, a stoker switch; license to
practice the patented combination arose by operation of law in those who
purchased the component from the licensee. The Mercoid Co., without a
license, manufactured and sold the unpatented switch to customers for
their use in the patented combination. Mercoid was offered a sub-license
to manufacture the component by the licensee but refused to purchase the
proferred license. The Court held that despite the fact that the unpatented
stoker switch had no use outside the patented invention, attempts to con-
trol the market in unpatented goods constituted patent misuse and barred
recovery for contributory infringement. 33
Demand for a congressional appraisal of the Mercoid cases devel-
oped.34 During the years in which Congress considered general legisla-
tion to codify the patent laws, attention was given to the problems con-
fronted by the patentee in the "Mercoid" situation. Unfortunately,
"Mercoid" became a term which was used indiscriminately to describe
the result that the Patent Act of 1952 would change. But "Mercoid" did
not mean the same thing to everyone in that legislative arena35 and, many
years later in Dawson, "Mercoid" would continue to stand for competing
propositions. 36
B. Enactment of the Statutory Standard
Although the foregoing review of the development of the judicially-
Co., 314 U.S. 488 (1942) (attempt to control market for salt tablets used in patented dispenser was
patent misuse; misuse doctrine linked to traditional "unclean hands" doctrine applied by courts of
equity); Leitch Mfg. Co. v. Barber Co., 302 U.S. 458 (1938) (linkage of process patent for curing
cement to sale of unpatented bituminous emulsion was patent misuse); and Carbice Corp. v. Ameri-
can Patents Co., 283 U.S. 27 (1931) (patent misuse where patentee's sole licensee tied use of pat-
ented refrigeration package to purchase from the licensee of the refrigerant, dry ice). See note 85
infra for the different opinions expressed by the majority and dissent regarding the nonstaple charac-
ter of the component at issue in B.B. Chem. Co.
31. Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661 (1944) (MercoidF); Mercoid Corp.
v. Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co., 320 U.S. 680 (1944) (Mercoid.If).
32. Mercoidl, 320 U.S. at 664 (1944).
33. Id. at 666.
34. The palpable concern of the patent bar following the Mercoid decisions is mentioned by
Justice Blackmun in Dawson, 448 U.S. at 199.
35. See generally note 78 infra.
36. See note 78 infra for a discussion of some of the different propositions for which Mercoid has
stood.
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propounded doctrines of contributory infringement and patent misuse
lends the present controversy historical perspective, 37 the precedential
value of these cases is limited by the enactment of the Patent Act of
1952.38
Section 27139 of the Patent Act of 1952 codifies the judicially devel-
oped doctrines of direct infringement, contributory infringement, and pat-
ent misuse. The two code sections at the crux of the Dawson litigation are
271(c) and (d). Section 271(c) defines contributory infringement nar-
rowly and distinguishes between staple and nonstaple articles of com-
merce. It confers on the patentee a privilege to protect his patent by prose-
cuting the seller of an unpatented component if. (1) the component is a
nonstaple article of commerce; (2) it is incapable of substantial nonin-
fringing use; (3) it is a material part of the invention; and (4) the seller
knows the above to be true. 40 Section 271(c) considerably narrows the
privileges afforded a patentee at the high water mark of contributory in-
37. The review also may be of some assistance to the reader when the problems associated with
the legislative history of the Patent Act of 1952 are considered. See notes 66-88 and accompanying
text infra.
38. 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-293 (1976).
39. The Patent Act of 1952 was "a bill to revise and codify the laws." Patent Law Codification
and Revision: Hearings on H.R. 3760 Before Subcomm. No. 3 of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 82d
Cong., Ist Sess. Title Page (1951). Patent infringement is defined in 35 U.S.C. § 271 as follows:
(a) Except as otherwise provided in this title, whoever without authority makes, uses or sells
any patented invention, within the United States during the term of the patent therefor, infringes
the patent.
(b) Whoever actively induces infringement of a patent shall be liable as an infringer.
(c) Whoever sells a component of a patented machine, manufacture, combination or compo-
sition, or a material or apparatus for use in practicing a patented process, constituting a material
part of the invention, knowing the same to be especially made or especially adapted for use in an
infringement of such patent, and not a staple article or commodity of commerce suitable for
substantial noninfringing use, shall be liable as a contributory infringer.
(d) No patent owner otherwise entitled to relief for infringement or contributory infringe-
ment of a patent shall be denied relief or deemed guilty of misuse or illegal extension of the
patent right by reason of his having done one or more of the following: (1) derived revenue from
acts which if performed by another without his consent would constitute contributory infringe-
ment of the patent; (2) licensed or authorized another to perform acts which if performed without
his consent would constitute contributory infringement of the patent; (3) sought to enforce his
patent rights against infringement or contributory infringement.
35 U.S.C. § 271 (1976).
Section 271(a) is the first statutory definition of patent infringement. To be liable for direct in-
fringement, the offender must manufacture, use, or sell all of the elements of the patent defined in the
claim during the authorized term of the patent. Section 271 (b) provides that one who actively induces
another to infringe the patent will be personally liable for the infringement. Section 27 1(c) states the
conditions under which a seller of one or more components required to practice the patent will be
liable as a contributory infringer. Section 271 (d) lists three kinds of activities in which the patentee
may engage without committing patent misuse, and hence without barring recovery by the patentee
against an infringer.
40. 35 U.S.c. § 271(c) (1976).
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fringement. 41 By limiting the remedy of contributory infringement to
nonstaple articles, "it is no longer necessary to resort to the doctrine of
patent misuse in order to deny patentees control over staple goods used in
their inventions. "42 Nonetheless, the patentee is afforded protection be-
yond the technical scope of the patent claim.
Those who advocated giving the patentee broader control over unpat-
ented, nonstaple components recognized that unless the breadth of patent
misuse was restricted from the scope the Court had given the doctrine
through Mercoid, section 271(c) alone would give a patentee little protec-
tion.43 No commercial exploitation by the patentee of the unpatented
component would succeed against the defense of patent misuse as the
Court had applied it in the Mercoid decisions. 44
Section 271 (d)45 was thus enacted to limit the defense of patent misuse.
Subsection (1) of 271(d) excludes from patent misuse the patentee's sale
of material, nonstaple, unpatented components of his invention. Subsec-
tion (2) authorizes the patentee to license another manufacturer either to
sell the unpatented component or to practice the patented method. With-
out such license the non-patentee manufacturer of the unpatented compo-
nent would be guilty of contributory infringement under section 271(c).
Subsection (3) allows a patentee to bring an infringement suit without
committing patent misuse and is a clear legislative reversal of the over-
zealous interpretation of Mercoid by the court in Stroco Products, Inc. v.
Mullenbach.46 None of these acts is patent misuse by law. The language
of section 271(d) is deceptively simple, but its interpretation is prob-
lematic because section 271(d) does not expressly define what acts consti-
tute patent misuse. Rather, because the section only delineates three acts
which are not to be construed as patent misuse, courts may still find that
unenumerated acts or hybrids of enumerated acts are patent misuse.
41. See the text accompanying note 25 supra for a discussion of the conduct permitted the A.B.
Dick patentee.
42. Dawson, 448 U.S. at 200.
43. See note 72 infra where the chief draftsman's. views on the necessity of limiting patent
misuse are presented. If patent misuse was not legislatively limited, § 271(c) would offer protection
only in those cases where the patentee either chose not to practice the patent in its entirety or chose to
limit his economic gain to the proceeds from th- sale of direct licenses.
44. Arguably, the patentee after Mercoid, but before enactment of § 271, would not be guilty of
patent misuse if he both marketed the nonstaple, unpatented component and sold licenses to compet-
ing manufacturers of the component to practice the patented method. This case never came to the
Court. Nevertheless, it is instructive to note in this regard that the licensee's willingness to sell li-
censes to sub-licensees in Mercoid did not immunize the patentee from liability for patent misuse. See
Mercoidl, 320 U.S. at 666-67.
45. 35 U.S.C. § 271(d) (1976).
46. 67 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 168, 170 (S.D. Cal. 1944).
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C. Judicial Interpretation of Section 271 Before Dawson
Judicial interpretation of the ambiguities of section 271 (d) before Daw-
son is scarce. Several lower court decisions addressed the legality of sales
by the patentee of unpatented, nonstaple components.4 7 Although no case
before Dawson required the Supreme Court to construe the scope of per-
missible patentee conduct under section 271(d), several cases illustrate
judicial hostility to the use of the patent monopoly to extend a patentee's
control to unpatented components of a combination patent. 48 As recently
47. Harte & Co. v. L.E. Carpenter & Co., 138 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 578 (S.D.N.Y. 1963), held that
where the patentee required licensees to purchase embossing rollers from it, and where the rollers
were nonstaple, unpatented components material to the patented process, the patentee was not guilty
of patent misuse. The court said: "35 U.S.C. § 271(d) indicates, although the point is far from
settled, that on these facts defendant's sales of rollers at cost to its licensees, even if 'tied' to the
patent license, cannot be deemed to be an illegal extension of the patent grant." Id. at 584. A plausi-
ble argument can be made that Harte is distinguishable from Dawson because the Harte patentee,
who sold the component at cost, was not deriving his profit from the sale of an unpatented element of
the invention. Nonetheless, the result of the "tying" in both cases is to stifle competition in sales of
the unpatented component.
In Sola Elec. Co. v. General Elec. Co., 146 F. Supp. 625 (N.D. Ill. 1956), the court rejected the
patent misuse defense where the patentee sold a nonstaple, unpatented element necessary to his in-
vention and with the sale granted an implied license to use the component in the patented system. The
Sola court stated:
These acts are by paragraph (d) of Section 271, above quoted, declared not to be misuse of the
patent right. The court holds, accordingly, that the said Act of 1952 makes proper and lawful
that which under the doctrine of the Mercoid cases, above cited, would have been a misuse of
the patent.
Id. at 648. The patentee in Sola, unlike Rohm & Haas, did not condition acquisition of a license for
the patented process on purchase from the patentee of the unpatented component, so Sola did not
present the same "tying" issue.
In Electric Pipe Line, Inc. v. Fluid Sys., Inc., 231 F.2d 370 (2d Cir. 1956), the patentee of a
combination patent both designed the installation and guaranteed its performance. The Second Cir-
cuit found under these facts that it was not unreasonable for the patentee to insist that the unpatented
components be obtained from it. The court declined to determine whether the patentee's behavior was
shielded by § 271 (d). The court said, regarding the scope of patentee behavior protected by § 271 (d),
"[a]lthough this argument has some merit, we need not here determine its validity, since we have
decided that defendant's method of doing business is not proscribed by Mercoid." Id. at 372 (dic-
tum). See also Comment, Effect of-Section 271 on the Doctrine of Contributory Infringement, 55
MICH. L. REV. 1151 (1957).
48. In United States v. Loew's Inc., 371 U.S. 38 (1962), the Court cited Mercoid and older cases
denying relief for infringement where the patentee utilized tying arrangements. The Court said:
"These cases reflect a hostility to use of the statutorily granted patent monopoly to extend the paten-
tee's economic control to unpatented products. The patentee is protected as to his invention, but may
not use his patent rights to exact tribute for other articles." Id. at 46.
In Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100 (1969), the Court stated:
"Among other restrictions upon him, he [the patentee] may not condition the right to use his patent
on the licensee's agreement to purchase, use, or sell, or not to purchase, use, or sell, another article
of commerce not within the scope of his patent monopoly." Id. at 136. See also Blonder-Tongue
Labs, Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation, 402 U.S. 313, 343 (1971) (citing Mercoid as one of a
"series of decisions in which the Court has condemned attempts to broaden the physical or temporal
scope of the patent monopoly").
530
Contributory Infringement and Patent Misuse
as 1972, in Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp.,49 the Court urged a
narrow interpretation of the patentee's privilege to exploit his patent. 50 In
Aro Manufacturing Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co. (Aro 1)51
and Aro Manufacturing Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co. (Aro
11)52 the Court reaffirmed the validity of holdings rendered prior to the
Patent Act of 1952, including Mercoid, which had broadened the scope of
patent misuse at the expense of contributory infringement. 53 Finally, nu-
merous Supreme Court dicta have appeared which ascribe to Congress a
narrow purpose for enacting section 271(d).54
49. 406 U.S. 518 (1972).
50. Id. at 530. The Court stated:
[W]e should not expand patent rights by overruling or modifying our prior cases construing the
patent statutes, unless the argument for expansion of privilege is based on more than mere infer-
ence from ambiguous statutory language. We would require a clear and certain signal from
Congress before approving the position of a litigant who . . . argues that the beachhead of
privilege is wider, and the area of public use narrower, than courts had previously thought. No
such signal legitimizes respondent's position in this litigation.
Id. at 531. This language was quoted most recently by the Court in Parker v. Rook, 437 U.S. 584,
596(1978).
51. 365 U.S. 336(1961).
52. 377 U.S. 476 (1964).
53. The Aro cases involved lawsuits for contributory infringement where a competitor of the
patentee manufactured and sold a-specialty fabric designed for use in a patented convertible top com-
bination. The decisions are relevant because each relies on the Court's Mercoid holdings and because
Aro I contains Justice Black's influential concurring opinion, reprinted in part in note 54 infra.
54. See, e.g., Justice Black's concurring opinion in Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replace-
ment Co., 365 U.S. 336 (1961) (Aro I):
The language and history of that Act show plainly: (1) that Congress wanted to continue in
force, but not expand, the judge-made doctrine of contributory infringement under which a per-
son who knowingly aids, encourages or abets the direct infringement of a patent is to be held
liable as a contributory infringer;, (2) that Congress did not want patentees to be barred from
prosecuting their claims for direct infringement merely because they exercised their right to
assert a claim in or out of court for contributory infringement; (3) that the long-existing scope of
a patentee's monopoly rights was not to be expanded beyond what it had always been, that is,
the exclusive right to make, use or sell a patented invention during the life of the patent.
Id. at 347-50 (Black, J., concurring). Further, Justice Black stated that § 271(d) "was designed
specifically to prevent the Mercoid Case from being interpreted to mean that any effort to enforce a
patent against a contributory infringer in itself constitutes a forfeiture of patent rights .... Id. at 349
n.4 (Black, J., concurring). See note 78 infra for a discussion of the different interpretations which
have been given to Mercoid.
Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 377 U.S. 476 (1964) (Aro II), did not require
the Court to determine permissible patentee conduct under § 271(d), although there are substantial
dicta that discuss the legislative intent for the enactment of § 271. The majority said: "Congress
enacted § 271 for the express purpose of reinstating the doctrine of contributory infringement as it had
been developed by decisions prior to Mercoid, and of overruling any blanket invalidation of the
doctrine that could be found in the Mercoid opinions." 377 U.S. at 492. In more dicta, the new Aro
1I majority cited footnote 6 of Justice Harlan's dissenting opinion from Aro I with approval. The
footnote stated:
It seems clear from the legislative history of the 1952 Act that Congress intended (1) to reaf-
firm the doctrine of contributory infringement .... , (2) [to] give that doctrine precedence against
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II. AN ANALYSIS OF THE DAWSON COURT'S REASONING
A. The Court's Interpretation of Section 271(d)
Section 271(d) limits a patentee's power to exploit his invention
through the sale of unpatented, nonstaple material components. Unfortu-
nately the seemingly straightforward statute leaves many questions un-
answered. The majority and dissenting opinions in Dawson reflect the
major conflict, a conflict which existed among commentators writing
after the enactment of the statute. 55
Justice Blackmun, writing for a five-Justice majority, construed section
271(d) to confer on the patentee the right to control the market for the
unpatented, nonstaple propanil. 56 After describing the three activities
protected by section 271(d)-selling propanil, licensing competitors to
sell the substance, and initiating an infringement suit-Justice Blackmun
stated that section 271 (d) immunized tying of the patented process to pur-
chases of propanil from Rohm & Haas. 57 According to Justice Blackmun:
The statute explicitly states that a patentee may do "one or more" of these
permitted acts, and it does not state that he must do any of them.
In our view, the provisions of § 271 (d) effectively confer upon the pa-
tentee, as a lawful adjunct of his patent rights, a limited power to exclude
others from competition in nonstaple goods. A patentee may sell a nonsta-
ple article himself while enjoining others from marketing that same good
without his authorization. By doing so, he is able to eliminate competitors
a claim of patent misuse as conceived in the Mercoid Cases, at least where the misuse is said to
inhere simply in assertion of patent rights.
Aro 1, 365 U.S. at 378 n.6 (Harlan, J., dissenting), cited with approval in Aro 11, 377 U.S. at 492.
The ambiguity of Justice Harlan's statement is underscored by the fact that both Dawson's and Rohm
& Haas' briefs before the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals cited the statement to support their conflict-
ing interpretations of Congress' intent. Rohm & Haas emphasized the phrase "give that doctrine
precedence" in § (2) while Dawson relied on the second clause of the same section, "where the
misuse is said to inhere simply in assertion of patent rights." Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant at 19.
Rohm & Haas Co. v. Dawson Chem. Co., 599 F.2d 685 (5th Cir. 1979); Brief and Addendum for
Appellees at 16, Rohm & Haas Co. v. Dawson Chem. Co., 599 F.2d 685 (5th Cir. 1979). The final
segment of Aro I1, which was supported by only a four-Justice plurality, stated that a patentee "can-
not impose conditions concerning the unpatented supplies, ancillary materials, or components with
which the use [of a patented combination] is to be effected." 377 U.S. at 497.
55. Commentary supporting the majority's interpretation of § 271 includes, e.g., Scafetta, Ten
Years After Aro II: The Effect of Patent Act § 271 on the Patent Misuse Doctrine, 26 S.C. L. REV.
539 (1975), reprinted in 58 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 69 (1976), and Note, Combination Patents: The Right
to Prohibit Sales of Replacement Parts, 70 YALE L.J. 649 (1961).
Commentary tending to support the minority's view of the statute includes, e.g., Note, Contribu-
tory Infringement and Misuse-The Effect of Section 271 of the Patent Act of 1952, 66 HARV. L.
REV. 909 (1953), and Note, Section 271(b) of the Patent Act of 1952: Confusion Codified. 66 YALE
L.J. 132 (1956).
56. 448U.S.at2Ol.
57. Id.
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and thereby to control the market for that product. Moreover, his power to
demand royalties from others for the privilege of selling the nonstaple item
itself implies that the patentee may control the market for the nonstaple
good; otherwise, his "right" to sell licenses for the marketing of the non-
staple good would be meaningless, since no one would be willing to pay
him for a superfluous authorization. 58
The majority's reasoning is specious. First, Justice Blackmun's restate-
ment of what section 271(d) does allow (one or more of the acts listed)
and what it doesn't require (that a patentee do any of those acts) avoids
the central issue. As he recognized later in the opinion, the statute does
not address the "tying" question at all. 59 The fact that the statute does not
require a patentee to license others to market the nonstaple component in
no way answers the question whether it is patent misuse to refuse to li-
cense others when the patentee itself markets the component. Further, the
majority's assertion that section 271(d) authorizes a patentee to control
the market for the nonstaple component, because otherwise the patentee's
power to license and demand royalties would be meaningless, is disput-
able. 60 Even if the patentee does not control the market in the nonstaple
component, licenses would not be superfluous. If competing manufactur-
ers wish to sell the nonstaple component to users who have not purchased
a license to practice the process from Rohm & Haas, the licenses would
be necessary or the manufacturer would be contributorily infringing the
patent in violation of section 271(c). 61 Thus, the patentee may derive rev-
enue from these licenses without controlling the market for the nonstaple
component. The majority's conclusion that section 271(d) authorizes sup-
pression of competition in material, nonstaple components of the patented
58. Id.
59. Id. at 202.
60. Id. at 233 (White, J., dissenting). The minority disputed the majority's reasoning that the
right conferred by § 271(d)(2) is rendered worthless if the patentee may be only "one competitor
among many freely competing." Id. Footnote 8 of the dissent discusses the economic value to plain-
tiff of the right to license competitors to sell an unpatented component of the invention:
Because respondent may collect royalties on these licenses, the right to license competing
sellers of propanil is not without economic value. In any event, even if it is more efficient or
more profitable for respondent to collect its returns by exacting monopoly profits from the sale of
propanil, this does not justify extension of the patent monopoly to the market for unpatented
materials.
Id. at 233 n.8 (White, J., dissenting) (citing B.B. Chem. Co. v. Ellis, 314 U.S. 495, 498 (1942)).
See note 85 infra for a discussion of the different treatment given B.B. Chem. Co. by the majority and
dissent in Dawson.
61. See 448 U.S. at 234 n.9 (White, J., dissenting). The minority stated, "The fact that royalties
could be collected on such licenses might have some effect on the propanil market, but it does not
follow that respondent may refuse to grant any licenses, thereby excluding all competitors from the
propanil market." Id.
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invention is poorly reasoned and thus gives little support to its position
that Rohm & Haas' conduct is protected.
Dissenting, Justice White reasoned that Rohm & Haas' conduct was
not expressly immunized from the patent misuse doctrine because none of
the three exceptions state that the patentee may exclude all competitors
from the propanil market by agreeing to license only those who purchase
propanil from Rohm & Haas. 62 Because section 271(d) only defines three
patentee activities that will not be deemed patent misuse, 63 Justice White
believed that "the fact that respondent may have engaged in one or more
of the acts enumerated in § 271(d) does not preclude its conduct from
being deemed patent misuse." 64
Ultimately, the minority concluded that Rohm & Haas' tying conduct
was patent misuse. To avoid misuse, a patentee who sells the unpatented
component must either license others to practice the process without tying
the license to purchase of the substance or license other manufacturers to
sell the substance. Thus, for a patentee engaging in the conduct protected
by section 271 (d) (1) there would be a compulsory licensing requirement.
Justice White argued that "the absence of any express mention of a li-
censing requirement does not indicate that respondent's refusal to license
others is protected by § 271 (d)." 65
62. Id. at 232 (White, J., dissenting).
63. 35 U.S.C. § 271(d) (1976). See note 39 supra for the text of§ 271.
64. 448 U.S. at 233 (White, J., dissenting).
65. Id. at 234 (White, J., dissenting). Justice White summarized the dissenters' position:
The fact that respondent may not refuse to license competing sellers of propanil who do not
purchase the product from it is not inconsistent with the notion that a patent holder is free to
suppress his invention or to reserve it entirely to himself. Respondent may discontinue all sales
of propanil and all licensing of its patented process and yet itself continue to use propanil in the
patented process without being guilty of patent misuse. But it may not sell propanil to others,
thus granting them patent licenses by operation of law, while refusing to license competing
sellers of propanil, thus effectively excluding them from the market.
Id. at 234 n. 10 (White, J., dissenting).
Justice Blackmun's rejection of the petitioner's argument, an argument accepted by the dissent, is
strong:
First, as we have noted, § 271(d) permits such licensing but does not require it. Accordingly,
petitioners' suggestion would import into the statute a requirement that simply is not there. Sec-
ond, petitioners have failed to adduce any evidence from the legislative history that the offering
of a license to the alleged contributory infringer was a critical factor in inducing Congress to
retreat from the result of the Mercoid decisions. Indeed, the Leeds & Catlin decision, which did
not involve such an offer to license, was placed before Congress as an example of the kind of
contributory infringement action the statute would allow. Third, petitioners' argument runs con-
trary to the long-settled view that the essence of a patent grant is the right to exclude others from
profiting by the patented invention. . . . If petitioners' argument were accepted, it would force
patentees either to grant licenses or to forfeit their statutory protection against contributory in-
fringement. Compulsory licensing is a rarity in our patent system, and we decline to manufac-
ture such a requirement out of § 27 1(d).
Id. at 215.
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B. Legislative History of the Patent Act of 1952
By emphasizing the discrete elements of Rohm & Haas' conduct-
selling propanil and refusing to license competitors to manufacture the
substance-Justice Blackmun's majority opinion concluded that it fell
within the express exceptions to patent misuse carved out by section
271(d). Justice Blackmun conceded, however, that the statute does not
expressly address the linkage of two protected activities from patent
misuse and it is this linkage or "tying" which persuaded the dissent that
Rohm & Haas had committed misuse. 66 Because the statute fails to expli-
citly address the crucial issue raised in Dawson, both the majority67 and
the dissent68 review extensively the legislative history for guidance.
Unfortunately, the legislative history is a less reliable guide to the in-
tended scope of patent misuse than is the straightforward but incomplete
language of section 271(d). The long and frequently technical testimony
given by a myriad of witnesses to subcommittees 69 of the House Commit-
tee on the Judiciary during hearings conducted in 1948, 1949, and 1951 is
so inconclusive and contradictory that both the majority and the dissent
found suitable quotations to buttress their respective viewpoints.
70
The majority's reliance on the legislative history to determine the scope
Congress intended to give the patent misuse defense is misplaced for
three major reasons. First, many statements do not stand for the proposi-
tion for which they are quoted. For example, the comment by Giles
Rich,71 that exceptions needed to be made to the patent misuse doctrine in
order to revive contributory infringement, does not establish that Con-
gress intended to permit a patentee to control the market in nonstaple
components necessary to his invention. 72 Justice Blackmun approvingly
66. Id. at 232 (White, J., dissenting).
67. Id. at202-12.
68. Id. at 235-40 (White, J., dissenting).
69. See Hearings on H.R. 5988 Before the Subcomm. on Patents, Trademarks and Copyrights of
the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. (1948) [hereinafter cited as 1948 Hear-
ings]; Hearings on H.R. 3866 Before Subcomm. No. 4 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 81st
Cong., 1st Sess. (1950) [hereinafter cited as 1949 Hearings]; Patent Law Codification and Revision:
Hearings on H.R. 3760 Before Subcomm. No. 3 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 82d Cong.,
Ist Sess. (1951) [hereinafter cited as 1951 Hearings]. These hearings are noted and described in
Justice Blackmun's majority opinion in Dawson. 448 U.S. at 204-12.
70. *448 U.S. at 202-12,235-40 (White, J., dissenting).
71. Giles Rich was a member of the Coordinating Committee on Revisions and Amendment of
the Patent Laws of the National Council of Patent Associations. He was the chief draftsman of the
proposed infringement section of the Patent Act, now § 271.
72. Giles Rich stated to the Committee:
I would like to recall that we are dealing with a problem which involves a conflict between
tvo doctrines, contributory infringement and misuse.
It is crystal clear, when you have thoroughly studied this subject, that the only way you can
make contributory infringement operative again as a doctrine, is to make some exceptions to the
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quoted Rich's statement that a patentee "can control only things like the
switches in the Mercoid case, which are especially made or adapted for
use in connection with such patent and which are not suitable for actual,
commercial, noninfringing use." ' 73 Although this is probably the least
obfuscated interpretation of the intent of section 271(d) made before the
subcommittees in the entire three years, even this statement does not
begin to address the precise scope of patentee "control" which the statute
was designed to confer. For example, the reference to Mercoid in Rich's
testimony fails to answer the "tying" issue raised in Dawson because
Mercoid refused to purchase a proffered sub-license while Rohm & Haas
refused to sell a license when Dawson offered to purchase one.
Second, no statement in the legislative history addresses the exact
question before the Court. 74 Unfortunately, no drafter or legislator ever
tried to describe the precise acts or omissions which still, after enactment
of section 271 (d), might be the basis for denying a patentee relief against
contributory infringement. 75 In fact, a close reading of the testimony re-
misuse doctrine and say that certain acts shall not be misuse. Then contributory infringement.
which is there all the time, becomes operative again.
Contributory infringement has been destroyed by the misuse doctrine; and to revive it you do
not have to do anything with contributory infringement itself. You go back along the same road
until you get to the point where you have contributory infringement working for you again.
448 U.S. at 207-08 (quoting 1949 Hearings, supra note 69, at 13-14).
73. 448 U.S. at 208 (quoting 1949 Hearings, supra note 69, at 17). Rich's statement in the 1951
Hearings concerning the antithetical underpinnings of contributory infringement and patent misuse is
even more ambiguous. Rich there stated:
Other decisions following Mercoid have made it quite clear that at least some courts are going
to say that any effort whatever to enforce a patent against a contributory infringer is in itself
misuse. The cases are cited in the old hearings. Therefore, we have always felt-we who study
this subject particularly-that to put any measure of contributory infringement into law you
must, to that extent and to that extent only, specifically make exceptions to the misuse doctrine,
and that is the purpose of paragraph (d).
1951 Hearings, supra note 69, at 161-62.
74. Justice White denied that Justice Blackmun's broad conclusion, that Congress sought to give
patent holders complete control over nonstaple materials, is supported by the legislative history. Be-
cause the acts described in § 271 (d) "were specified as exceptions to what otherwise might have been
considered patent misuse under the Mercoid decision," Justice Blackmun's conclusion, that the pat-
entee who monopolizes nonstaple components is never subject to the defense of patent misuse, is
illogical. 448 U.S. at 238 (White, J., dissenting). According to Justice White:
The Court offers little to support its position that § 271(d) was intended to put nonstaples
completely beyond the reach of the misuse doctrine. Otherwise, § 271(c) could simply have
stated that the patentee could have his appropriate remedies against contributory infringement as
defined in the section without regard to the defense of patent misuse. Of course, this is precisely
the result the Court arrives at, but this extends the exemption far beyond what the committees
were told § 271(d) would effect. Indeed, the representations were that aside from the exemptions
spelled out in § 271(d), a patentee's control of nonstaples would be subject to the doctrine of
patent misuse.
Id.
75. Rich did suggest that "solely" be added to the third line of the proposed § 27 1(d) so that the
patentee "shall not be deemed guilty of misuse or illegal extension of patent rights solely by reason of
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veals that it is replete with inconsistencies and contradictions which were
never resolved in the written record. 76 One is struck by the lack of any
clear indication by the Committee that it either understood the long line of
Supreme Court cases applying patent misuse to prevent the patentee from
exploiting the patent beyond the limit of its technical claim, or, in the
patented combination/unpatented nonstaple component cases, intended to
authorize the patentee to monopolize the unpatented substance. Witnesses
never clearly stated that they wanted the subsection to immunize the be-
havior of the Mercoid patentee, and there is no discussion of the propriety
of the "tying" conduct raised by Dawson.77 Instead, they described the
impact of the proposed section enigmatically by references to Mercoid,78
his having done one or more of the following. If he has gone beyond those and done other acts which
could be misuse, then the misuse doctrine would be applicable." 1951 Hearings, supra note 69, at
175.
76. A glaring example of inconsistent and contradictory testimony is illustrated by the exchange
among Giles Rich, Rep. Crumpacker (R. Ind.), and the Justice Department representative, Wilbur
Fugate. Justice Blackmun used only the latter part of an exchange between Wilbur Fugate, testifying
against the bill, and Rep. Crumpacker which began as follows:
Mr. FUGATE. Because it is all-inclusive. No one shall be guilty of misuse if he has sought to
enforce his patent rights against infringement or contributory infringement. As I read it, you
might also add "even though he has misused his patent."
In the Mercoid case for example -
Mr. CRUMPACKER. It says that he shall not be deemed guilty of misuse because he has done
one of these three things. It doesn't say that he shall be deemed not guilty of misuse because he
has done this. I think you are reading it backward. That is, he may have done all three of these
things and still be guilty of misuse, as I interpret the language.
1951 Hearings, supra note 69, at 167. Fugate requested Rich to confirm Fugate's interpretation of §
271(c) and it is the following portion that Justice Blackmun quoted in the majority opinion:
Mr. RiCH: I will agree with [Fugate's interpretation] to this extent: That as I testified it is neces-
sary to make an exception to misuse to the extent that you revive contributory infringement in
paragraph (c), and this whole section (d) is entirely dependent on (c). Where (d) refers to contri-
butory infringement, it only refers to contributory infringement as defined in (c) and nothing
more.
Mr. CRUMPACKER: In other words, all it says is that bringing an action against someone who is
guilty of contributory infringement is not a misuse of the patent.
Mr. RiCH: That is true.
448 U.S. at 212 (quoting 1951 Hearings, supra note 69, at 169).
Although Justice Blackmun's reason for including this passage is not made totally clear, his basic
proposition is supported only if one assumes that it is cited with Fugate's position as authoritative.
Rich did say he agreed with Fugate's interpretation but the balance of Rich's statements, which are
quoted instead of Fugate's, extensively limits that answer. Furthermore, Crumpacker's statement
does not agree with Fugate's at all, and, for this, Blackmun cited Rich's agreement. Not only are
statements of opposing and supporting witnesses at legislative hearings unreliable as evidence of
legislative intent, but here the two conflict and the only statement from a Congressman that is quoted
does not support Justice Blackmun's conclusion regarding the intended scope of § 271(d). See 1951
Hearings, supra note 69, at 169.
77. A review of the 1948, 1949, and 1951 hearings reveals no explicit discussion of these issues.
See 1948 Hearings, 1949 Hearings, and 1951 Hearings, supra note 69.
78. Because the judiciary had never agreed on the meaning of Mercoid (nor did they agree on its
meaning in Dawson), references to Mercoid in the legislative history, without further elaboration, are
537
Washington Law Review Vol. 56:523, 1981
Carbice Corp. v. American Patents Co. ,79 and Leitch Manufacturing Co.
v. Barber Co. 80 The only uncontroverted inference that may be drawn
from the testimony is that the mere act of filing a contributory infringe-
ment suit would not be patent misuse, as at least one court 81 after Mercoid
had held.
Third, the majority relied exclusively on statements made by witnesses
who may or may not have been expressing congressional intent, 82 and
statements made throughout several years of hearings during which the
membership of the Committee changed.
The dissent reached substantially different conclusions after reviewing
the legislative history. Justice White agreed that section 27 1(d) abrogated
the patent misuse defense in the Mercoid situation, where the patentee
sold the nonstaple component and controlled the nonstaple market while
offering licenses to other manufacturers to sell the component or practice
the method itself.83 In the foregoing situation, section 271 gave the paten-
tee the power to sue unlicensed contributory infringers selling the unpat-
ented, nonstaple component. Despite this threshold agreement, Justice
White argued that the majority's conclusion overstated the record:
But I do not understand the committee witnesses, when pressed in the 1951
Hearings, to suggest that § 271(d) authorized the patentee to condition the
patently unclear. The Dawson majority treated Mercoid as the first case to extend patent misuse to
control over unpatented, nonstaple goods. 448 U.S. at 195. To the dissent, Mercoid extended patent
misuse to the situation where the patentee controlled unpatented goods even though a sub-license to
sell the unpatented component was offered to and refused by another manufacturer. Id. at 229
(White, J., dissenting). The court in Stroco Products, Inc. v. Mullenbach, 67 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 168,
170 (S.D. Cal. 1944), had even interpreted dicta by Justice Douglas in Mercoid 1, 320 U.S. at
668-69, to mean that the very act of filing a lawsuit for contributory infringement itself would consti-
tute patent misuse. To Congressmen, statements that § 271 would "overrule" Mercoid could have
meant that any of the above types of conduct, formerly constituting patent misuse, was being rein-
stated.
79. 283 U.S. 27 (1931).
80. 302 U.S. 458 (1938). See note 30 supra for a brief description of the holdings in Carbice and
Leitch.
81. Stroco Products, Inc., v. Mullenbach, 67 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 168, 170 (S.D. Cal. 1944).
82. Justice White's dissent criticized the majority's reliance upon the interpretations of interested
witnesses rather than elected representatives:
It [the majority] discovers nothing favoring its position in the committee reports, the floor de-
bates, or in any materials originating with the legislators who sponsored or managed the bill or
who had any other intimate connection with the legislation. The Court is left with the opinions of
private patent attorneys as to the meaning of the proposed legislation and with the hearing testi-
mony of representatives of the Department of Justice opposing the bill. We have generally been
reluctant to rely on such citations for definitive guidance in construing legislation; and we should
not do so here, particularly when it means departing from the standards announced in our prior
cases for construing the 1952 legislation.
448 U.S. at 236-37 (White, J., dissenting).
83. Id. at 237 (White, J., dissenting).
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use of his process on purchasing the unpatented material from him and to
exclude from the market all other manufacturers or sellers even though they
would be willing to pay a reasonable royalty to the patent owner.
84
Thus, even if congressional intent was to overrule the Mercoid decision,
Dawson is distinguishable from Mercoid because in the latter case the
defendant refused to purchase the license that was offered. Rohm &
Haas' conduct is not automatically immunized from the patent misuse
doctrine by stating that section 27 1(d) overruled Mercoid.
The dissent concluded that Rohm & Haas' conduct, which constituted
patent misuse before Mercoid,85 was still misuse because there was no
convincing evidence that Congress intended to modify prior law and to
permit the patentee to monopolize unpatented components. 86 In fact,
statements made by the Senate floor leader for the Patent Act of 1952
indicate that the bill was intended to be a codification rather than a major
84. Id. at 238 (White, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
85. Id. at 230 (White, J., dissenting). To the dissent, it was clear that Rohm & Haas' conduct
would have constituted patent misuse at all times since B.B. Chem. Co. v. Ellis, 314 U.S. 495
(1942). Extending the patent monopoly to unpatented materials is classic patent misuse, and the fact
the unpatented product is a nonstaple "has been without significance at least since B.B. Chemi-
cal." 448 U.S. at 230 (White, J., dissenting).
The Dawson majority and dissent disagreed about the facts and holding in B.B. Chem. Co. The
dissent contended that B.B. Chem. Co. addressed the issue of patentee control of an unpatented,
nonstaple component in an attempt to show that even before Mercoid "the Court treated staple and
nonstaple materials alike insofar as patent misuse was concerned." Id. at 229 n.4 (White, J., dis-
senting). If B.B. Chem. Co. is a nonstaple patent misuse case predating Mercoid, doubt is cast upon
the majority's interpretation of Mercoid. See note 78 and accompanying text supra. This in turn
undermines the majority's reliance on the legislative history, which is replete with ambiguous refer-
ences to Mercoid, in interpreting Congress' intent for enacting § 271. The majority discussed its
interpretation ofB.B. Chein. Co. in footnote 12, where Justice Blackmun stated:
The question whether the allegedly nonstaple nature of the item affected the applicability of the
Carbice and Leitch standards was presented to the Court on certiorari.... In the petitioner's
brief on the merits, however, the nonstaple character of the item was not pressed as a ground for
legal distinction, and respondents argued that the material was not a nonstaple .... The Court
did not mention this question in its brief opinion. In contrast to the dissent.... we decline in the
absence of any articulated reasoning to speculate whether the Court accepted the respondents'
view that only a staple commodity was involed, adopted some other position, or, as the failure
to discuss Leeds & Catlin v. Victor Talking Machine Co., 213 U.S. 325, 29 S. Ct. 503, 53 L.
Ed. 816 (1909), might suggest, simply chose not to address a matter that had not been fully
presented.
448 U.S. at 194 n.12.
86. Id. at 239 (White, J., dissenting). As general description of the bill, both House and Senate
reports state:
Although the principal purpose of the bill is the codification of title 35, United States Code,
and involves simplification and clarification of language and arrangement, and elimination of
obsolete and redundant provisions, there are a number of changes in substantive statutory law.
These will be explained in some detail in the revision notes keyed to each section which appear
in the appendix of this report. The major changes or innovations in the title consist of incorpo-
rating a requirement for invention in § 103 and the judicial doctrine of contributory infringe-
ment in § 271.
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revision of the patent laws. 87 But Justice Blackmun rebutted this argu-
ment by stating that the Act was of such magnitude that the committee
reports gave only "relatively cursory attention to its features." 88
H.R. REP. No. 1923, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1952); S. REP. No. 1979, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 4,
reprinted in [1952] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2394, 2397 (emphasis added).
The summary of § 271 more specifically states:
Section 271, paragraph (a), is a declaration of what constitutes infringement. There is no
declaration of what constitutes infringement in the present statute. It is not actually necessary
because the granting clause creates certain exclusive rights and infringement would be any viola-
tion of those rights.
Paragraphs (b), (c), and (d) relate to the subject referred to as contributory infringement. The
doctrine of contributory infringement has been part of our law for about 80 years. It has been
applied to enjoin those who sought to cause infringement by supplying someone else with the
means and directions for infringing a patent. One who makes a special device constituting the
heart of a patented machine and supplies it to others with directions (specific or implied) to
complete the machine is obviously appropriating the benefit of the patented invention. It is for
this reason that the doctrine of contributory infringement, which prevents appropriating another
man's patented invention, has been characterized as "an expression both of law and morals."
Considerable doubt and confusion as to the scope of contributory infringement has resultedfrom
a number of decisions of the courts in recent years. The purpose of this section is to codify in
statutory form principles of contributory infringement and at the same time eliminate this doubt
and confusion. Paragraph (b) recites in broad terms that one who aids and abets an infringement
is likewise an infringer. The principle of contributory infringement is set forth in the provisions
of the next paragraph which is concerned with the usual situation in which contributory infringe-
ment arises. This latter paragraph is much more restricted than many proponents of contributory
infringement believe should be the case. The sale of a component of a patented machine, etc.,
must constitute a material part of the invention and must be known to be especially made or
especially adapted for use in the infringement before there can be contributory infringement, and
likewise the sale of staple articles of commerce suitable for noninfringement use does not consti-
tute contributory infringement. The last paragraph of this section provides that one who merely
does what he is authorized to do by statute is not guilty of misuse of the patent. These para-
graphs have as their main purpose clarification and stabilization.
H.R. REP. No. 1923, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1952); S. REP. No. 1979, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 8,
reprinted in [1952] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2394, 2402 (emphasis added).
87. 98 CONG. REc. 9323 (1952) (remarks of Sen. McCarran). The dissent noted this specifically
in footnote 13, where Justice White said:
The fact that § 271 was not intended to work a major repeal of the patent misuse doctrine is
reflected in the treatment the legislation received on the floor of the House and Senate. As the
Court of Appeals recognized, there was no debate on the House floor and scant comment in the
Senate. Just prior to the Senate vote, Senator McCarran, chairman of the Judiciary Committee
that had been responsible for the bill in the Senate, was asked by Senator Saltonstall, "Does the
bill change the law in any way or only codify the present patent laws?" Senator McCarran
replied, "It codifies the present patent laws." 98 Cong. Rec. 9323. Although Senator McCarran
later referred to the desire to clarify confusion that may have arisen from Mercoid.... there was
no indication that the legislation would work a major repeal of the patent misuse doctrine.
448 U.S. at 239 n. 13 (White, J., dissenting).
88. Id. at 203. Justice Blackmun offered this explanation of why the committee reports failed to
highlight this major revision in the patent misuse doctrine: "Perhaps because of the magnitude of the
recodification effort, the committee reports accompanying the 1952 Act also gave relatively cursory
attention to its features. Nevertheless, they did identify § 271 as one of the major changes or innova-
tions in the title. H.R. REP. No. 1923, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 5 (1952)." Id. (footnote omitted).
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The most reasonable conclusion that can be fairly drawn is that the
legislative history, even when reliance is placed on the testimony of wit-
nesses rather than elected officials, is murky and inconclusive. It cannot
support the majority's conclusion that the legislative history supplies the
answer to what the admittedly ambiguous statutory provision leaves open
to question.
C. The Dawson Court's Treatment of Earlier Judicial Construction of
Section 271
No single Supreme Court or lower court case since 1952 presented the
precise issue litigated in Dawson. On several occasions, however, the Su-
preme Court had discussed Congress' intent in enacting section 271, the
patent misuse doctrine, and the continuing vitality of Mercoid.89 The ma-
jority and dissenting opinions accord these earlier interpretations vastly
different weight and value in resolving the Dawson controversy.
Justice Blackmun denied that any post-1952 Supreme Court decisions,
except for the two Aro decisions, were relevant to the issue before the
Court in Dawson. 90
Many statements made in Aro I on the scope and continued vitality of
Mercoid were inconsistent with the Dawson majority's treatment of Mer-
coid. After discussing Aro I, Justice Blackmun concluded that the Aro I
statements were dicta. 91 He asserted that the controlling issue in Aro I
concerned direct infringement of the patent. The Aro I Court drew on the
Mercoid decisions only for the proposition that even single, unpatented
elements constituting the heart of a patented combination are not within
the scope of the patent grant. 92 Thus the references to Mercoid, read in
the context of the Aro I decision, did not conflict with the majority's deci-
sion. While the majority was clearly not bound by prior dicta, it was in-
sufficient simply to dismiss statements about the continuing vitality of
Mercoid by characterizing them as dicta where the dicta were so strong
and often repeated.
89. See notes 53 & 54 and accompanying text supra for a discussion of the occasions when the
Supreme Court discussed these points.
90. 448 U.S. at 216. See note 48 supra for a brief discussion of the cases which Justice Black-
mun dismissed as irrelevant to the Court's consideration of Dawson. Regarding each of those cases,
Justice Blackmun limited their expressions of judicial hostility to the facts of the case. Id. Though
none of the facts or issues were identical to those presented by Dawson, each of the cases directly
concerned patent infringement and § 271.
91. Id. at 217. See note 54 supra for the Aro I dicta which Justice Blackmun reconciled with
Dawson. However, Justice Blackmun found it necessary to specifically disapprove of language in
Justice Black's concurring opinion in Aro I which ascribed a narrow purpose to Congress' enactment
of§ 271(d). Id. at 218 n.22.
92. Id. at217.
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As for Aro II, Justice Blackmun merely stated that "[a]lthough our
review of the legislative history finds a broader intent, it is not out of
harmony with Aro II's analysis" 93 that section 271 was enacted solely to
reinstate the doctrine of contributory infringement. This statement failed
to resolve the tension, if not outright discord, between Aro II and Daw-
son. Furthermore, a four-Justice plurality in the final segment of Aro H
had stated that a patentee cannot impose conditions on unpatented sup-
plies or materials. 94 This strong language was contrary to the Dawson
majority's conclusions, but Justice Blackmun explained it away by stat-
ing that the Aro II plurality's interpretation was qualified by the circum-
stances to which it was applied, 95 namely the legal consequences of the
repair-reconstruction distinction at issue in the Aro decisions. Dawson
was significantly different according to Justice Blackmun, because it con-
cerned the staple-nonstaple distinction which was irrelevant to Aro.96
What the majority's summary failed to acknowledge was that even
though the Aro factual situation was different, the Aro opinions were still
constructions of section 271 with relevant comments on the scope of that
section. In its examination of the legislative history of section 271, the
Dawson Court found a congressional intent different than that found in
prior cases, most importantly the Aro decisions.
The dissent, throughout its discussion of the scope of section 271(d),
continued to treat both Aro cases and the policies expressed in Deepsouth
Packing as good law. 97
D. Concluding Remarks on the Dawson Court's Reasoning
Justice Blackmun first asserted that section 271 (d) authorized patentees
to control the market in nonstaple components of their patented method.
He recognized, however, that section 271(d) does not explicitly say this,
nor does it explicitly allow a tying arrangement like Rohm & Haas', so he
turned to legislative history to support his conclusions. From inconclusive
statements of witnesses to the House Committee on the Judiciary, Justice
Blackmun concluded that Congress did intend to allow patentees to con-
trol the market in nonstaple components, and thus Rohm & Haas' tying
arrangement was not patent misuse. Earlier interpretations of section
93. Id. at 219.
94. Aro I, 377 U.S. at 497. See note 54 supra where the statement by the Aro I1 plurality is
quoted.
95. 448 U.S. at 219.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 233 (White, J., dissenting). The dissent cited all three cases; then attacked the major-
ity's conclusion that the right conferred by § 271(d)(1) would be worthless if the patentee was re-
stricted to being one competitor among many. Id. at 234.
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27 1(d) that conflicted with this statement of congressional intent were dis-
missed as dicta.
Justice White's dissent insisted that section 271(d) did not authorize a
patentee to control the market in nonstaple components and that the legis-
lative history did not support such an extension of the patent. Further-
more, he treated the prior judicial interpretations of section 271 as persua-
sive on congressional intent.
Neither opinion, majority or dissent, gave policy considerations the at-
tention they deserved.
1II. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
Justice Blackmun candidly denied contemporary policy considerations
a role in resolving the scope of patent misuse under section 271(d). 98 In
his view, Congress had already resolved the tension between a policy of
free competition and a policy of stimulating invention. By enacting sec-
tions 271(c) and (d), which were designed to resuscitate contributory in-
fringement and to narrow the scope of the patent misuse defense, Con-
gress resolved the tension between the competing policies in favor of
invention. 99
Though expressly denying policy a role, the majority adopted Rohm &
Haas' argument that "new use" chemical research, where years of test-
ing precede the development of a new use with commercial or social
value for an existing substance, is extraordinarily expensive and deserv-
ing of protection. Unless a patentee is allowed to monopolize the unpat-
ented, nonstaple substance, "the rewards available to those willing to un-
dergo the time, expense, and interim frustration of such practical research
would provide at best a dubious incentive."100 Justice Blackmun agreed
with Rohm & Haas that "[o]thers could await the results of the testing
and then jump on the profit bandwagon by demanding licenses to sell the
unpatented, nonstaple chemical used in the newly developed process."101
Furthermore, this ignores the possibility that a patentee could derive its
profits from license fees paid by competitors to manufacture and sell the
product free of the strictures of section 271(c). Justice Blackmun stated:
"As a result, noninventors would be almost assured of an opportunity to
98. Id. at 220. Justice Blackmun stated that "public policy cannot be determinative of the out-
come unless specific policy choices fairly can be attributed to Congress itself." Id. at 220-21.
99. Despite the statutory ambiguities and the inconsistencies in both the legislative history and
post-1952 Supreme Court cases, Justice Blackmun was certain that "Congress' enactment of §
27 1(d) resolved these issues in favor of a broader scope of patent protection." Id. at 223.
100. Id. at 222.
101. Id.
543
Washington Law Review
share in the spoils, even though they had contributed nothing to the dis-
covery. The incentive to await the discoveries of others might well prove
sweeter than the incentive to take the initiative oneself."1 02
Justice White's dissenting opinion devoted only a single paragraph to
policy considerations. Because he found no "clear and certain signal
from Congress"103 in any of the statutory or legislative materials, he
would defer to Congress to decide whether, in order to stimulate research
and development in the chemical field, it is necessary to give "patentees
monopoly control over articles not covered by their patents. . . ." 104
Justice Stevens both joined Justice White's dissent and filed a separate
dissenting opinion which focused briefly on policy. Essentially Justice
Stevens suggested that the majority may have been unduly influenced
"by the particular facts of this case" 105-in other words, hard cases
make bad law.
It appears that it would not be particularly profitable to exploit this patent by
granting express licenses for fixed terms to users of propanil or by granting
licenses to competing sellers. Under these circumstances, the patent may
well have little or no commercial value unless the patentee is permitted to
engage in patent misuse. 106
Justice Stevens correctly pointed out that the Court's holding will permit
extension of the patent monopoly to unpatented nonstaples in cases where
the patent is commercially profitable without such extension. Justice Ste-
vens suggested that the Court's "nonstaple" exception may seem less
palatable in another factual setting. 107
102. Id.
103. Id. at 224 (White, J., dissenting). This was critical language in Deepsouth Packing Co. v.
Laitram, 406 U.S. 518, 531 (1972), and is discussed at note 50 and accompanying text supra.
104. 448 U.S. at 240 (White, J., dissenting).
105. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
106. Id. at 240-41 Justice Stevens doubted that granting express licenses to competing propanil
manufacturers would be particularly profitable to Rohm & Haas, but he neglected to substantiate his
assertion. Whether or not the revenue which Rohm & Haas could derive from licensing other sellers
would be sufficient to make the licensing program profitable is unascertainable from the information
contained in either Rohm & Haas' or Dawson Co.'s briefs. Neither brief discussed the actual devel-
opment costs attributable to the propanil method or the potential revenue which might be derived by
granting express licenses. Interestingly, though it would have been in Rohm & Haas' best interest,
they failed to argue that an express licensing scheme would be unprofitable.
107. Justice Stevens questioned whether the Court would be willing to apply the nonstaple ex-
ception where a manufacturer conditions "a long-term lease of a patented piece of equipment on the
lessee's agreement to purchase tailormade-i.e., nonstaple-supplies or components for use with
the equipment exclusively from the patentee." 448 U.S. at 241 (Stevens, J., dissenting). In that
situation, however, unless such supplies were "a material part of the invention" as § 271(c) requires,
it is clear such a conditional use license would still be patent misuse. Justice Stevens' example,
however, illustrates that the majority's nonstaple-based holding failed to provide a certain standard
for other patentees. In Dawson the litigants stipulated that propanil was both a nonstaple and a mate-
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A. Analysis
Both the majority and dissenting opinions accorded policy considera-
tions scant attention. Neither the literal meaning of the statute, the legisla-
tive history, nor case precedent address the question whether section 271
protects a patentee who markets a nonstaple component of his process
while refusing to license others. An analysis of the policy implications of
the contending statutory interpretations would have guided the Court to a
better result.
Three policies in the main support the interpretation contended for by
Rohm & Haas. First, it is extremely expensive to develop new "use"
applications for chemicals. 108 Legitimate patented inventions need pro-
tection from pirate companies seeking benefit from research conducted by
other companies. Second, where the use rather than the chemical com-
pound is patented, often simply adding water or some other common un-
patentable substance will constitute direct infringement. To police this
type of direct infringement is impossible. Without an action for contribu-
tory infringement, alternate methods of profiting from the patent are im-
practical. Such difficulty was the original catalyst which led to early judi-
cial recognition of contributory infringement, reinstated by section 27 1(c)
after years of emasculation by the courts. Hence, protection of patents by
the doctrine of contributory infringement is a congressional policy not to
be lightly overridden by the courts. Third, to require compulsory licens-
ing by the patentee where he seeks to market an unpatented component,
in the limited circumstances authorized by section 271(d), does violence
to the constitutional policy of securing to "Inventors the exclusive Right
to their... Discoveries."1 09 Further, Rohm & Haas argued that a com-
pulsory licensing requirement would discriminaten1 0 against one class of
rial part of the invention. If parties do not stipulate that the good is material and nonstaple, future
courts will be compelled to wrestle with these definitions under Justice Blackmun's formulation of
the scope of permissible patentee conduct.
108. The average research cost to discover and develop an agricultural pesticide was roughly
$7,400,000 in 1974. This does not include commercial costs such as building a plant to manufacture
the pesticide or selling the product. See Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant at 28, Rohm & Haas Co. v.
Dawson Chem. Co., 599 F.2d 685 (5th Cir. 1979). In his majority opinion, Justice Blackmun relied
on the $54 million cost of developing a new pharmaceutical drug. 448 U.S. at 222 n.24. However,
the Dawson litigation does not involve new drugs. Rather it was concerned with new uses for existing
chemical compounds.
109. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
110. Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant at 26-27, Rohm & Haas Co. v. Dawson Chem. Co., 599 F.2d
685 (5th Cir. 1979). Although an interpretation of § 271(d) so as to require licensing under certain
circumstances might produce a disparate impact among various classes of patentees, this disparate
impact is justifiable. Certain inventions are by their nature easier than others to "police" for contri-
butory infringement because of, for example, different methods of sale or ease of manufacture by
small businesses or consumers.
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patentees, those developing applications for unpatented components. All
other patentees, by longstanding judicial determination," l I are free to
choose not to exploit their patent at all, to license others, or to exploit it
on an exclusion basis. Finally, any control of the market the patentee
would receive under Rohm & Haas' interpretation of section 271(d)
would only be temporary. The right exclusively to market the unpatented
component would cease whenever additional commercial uses for the
substance were developed, because at that time the compound would
cease to be a nonstaple article of commerce. ' 2
Several contrary policies support a restrictive interpretation of section
271 (d) and the finding of patent misuse in Rohm & Haas' conduct. First,
to permit Rohm & Haas to monopolize sales of the unpatented propanil
effectively awards the company a patent in a compound which is unpat-
entable. 13 Second, if Rohm & Haas is permitted to monopolize sales of
an unpatented compound, it may, through label familiarity and estab-
lished marketing channels, be well positioned to enjoy substantial unwar-
ranted benefit in the propanil market after the expiration of the term of the
method patent. Third, if the patent misuse defense is applied under these
"tying" circumstances, competition may stimulate improvements in the
manufacture or marketing of the unpatented component. 114 Fourth, there
are alternative methods to enable Rohm & Haas to recoup its investment
without extending the patent monopoly. For a manufacturer, the most
practical choice would be to exact licensing royalties from competitors
who wanted to manufacture and sell the nonstaple component. By allow-
ing the patentee the benefit of direct sales and reasonable royalties the
substantial cost of development may be amortized over the life of the pat-
ent.
B. Proposal
The arguments on each side are impressive and neither result con-
111. For a discussion of the patentee's right to retain his patent for exclusive use, see 4 D. Cm-
SUM, PATENTS § 19.04[3][f] (1980).
112. Rohm & Haas will lack incentive to engage in research to discover additional uses for pro-
panil because, should they discover another use, propanil will cease to be a nonstaple and the com-
pany will lose its exclusive control of the substance.
113. Propanil was held to be unpatentable in Monsanto Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 312 F. Supp.
778 (E.D. Pa. 1970), aff'd, 456 F.2d 592 (3d Cir.), cert. denied 407 U.S. 934 (1972). Under the
Court's holding in Dawson, Rohm & Haas may monopolize propanil as fully as if the compound
were patented.
114. Dawson claimed its own unpatented improvements have reduced the cost of propanil from
$12.00 to $6.00 a gallon. Brief and Addendum for Appellees at 31, Rohm & Haas Co. v. Dawson
Chem. Co., 599 F.2d 685 (5th Cir. 1979). Should Rohm & Haas be allowed to market the chemical
exclusively, nothing will prevent Rohm & Haas from charging the higher price.
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tended for by the litigants is entirely satisfactory. The choice need not be
between allowing a patentee to monopolize an unpatented substance or
depriving a patentee of commercial profit from a patented invention. The
litigants established this dichotomy and the Court analyzed the statute as
if these were the only two possible outcomes. Instead the Court might
have borrowed from the law of antitrust and developed a patent law appli-
cation from the "rule of reason." 115 A rule of reason approach would
give the patentee a monopoly over the nonstaple component only where
no other commercially feasible means of deriving revenue from the pat-
ented method existed. Where a patentee could not justify control of the
unpatented component, a refusal to grant a license would constitute patent
misuse if the patentee was also selling the nonstaple.
Such a compromise approach would not promote certainty in the law.
Legal disputes may arise regarding whether a patentee could or could not
commercially exploit the patent without resort to exclusive control over
an unpatented substance. But legal certainty from the majority holding is
illusory too. 116 Under the majority holding, future litigants will argue
over the restrictions contained in section 271(c): is the component a non-
staple and is it a material part of the invention? Compulsory licensing, the
dissent's solution, is less likely to cause the actors uncertainty but suffers
from other defects, as Justice Blackmun discussed. 117
A rule of reason approach does not require either Congress or the
courts to choose between fostering competition or stimulating invention.
Both the needs of the patentee and the society can be accommodated if the
"either/or" approach to interpreting section 271(d) is abandoned.
Carlyn Joan Steiner
115. See P. AREDA & D. TURNER, ANTrrRUsT LAW § 314 (1978). In recent antitrust cases the
Supreme Court evidenced a tendency to prefer the rule of reason to per se rules. E.g., Continental
T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 443 U.S. 36 (1977).
Justice Stevens' approach in Dawson hints of, but does not develop, such a "rule of reason"
approach in response to the alternatives considered by the majority and the dissenters, thus extending
the patent monopoly to an unpatented component, versus compulsory licensing where a patentee sells
the substance directly. 448 U.S. at 240 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
116. Quite clearly, under petitioners' suggested interpretation of § 271(d), the next lawsuit
would involve what is a "reasonable royalty rate." The reasonableness of a patentee's offer of a
license to practice a patented method without purchase of unpatented items arises in cases clearly not
exempted by § 271(d). See 4 D. CisuM, PATENTS § 19.0413](a] (1980).
117. See note 65 supra.
